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Wood: Federal Prisoner Petitions.

FEDERAL PRISONER PETITIONS
JOHN H. WOOD, JR.*

Everyone is familiar with the variety of pressures that have been
placed upon the federal courts through the expanded use of prisoner
petitions. The Supreme Court of the United States has bestowed an
awesome omnipotent power on federal district judges, allowing a state
supreme court to be overruled in important constitutional issues involving criminal convictions.' This is an anomaly without comparison or
precedent in any other system of jurisprudence. While originally there
was well accepted authority in the federal system to the effect that its
courts would not ordinarily interfere with the internal administration
of prison institutions, thereby maintaining a hands-off policy, the record
belies this premise.
The original purpose of habeas corpus was to enforce the right of
2
personal liberty where the right was denied and the prisoner confined.
But the scope of the "Great Writ" has been greatly expanded, so much
so that many legal scholars contend that habeas corpus has been greatly
abused and is creating almost impossible burdens for the judiciary. They
point to strained relations between state and federal jurisdictions and
contend that signficant restrictions are needed to limit the repeated and
endless retrial of criminal convictions. Conversely, others say that an
adequate opportunity for a person convicted in a state court to have a
federal court review is essential, and that none of the suggestions yet
made for restricting habeas corpus are adequate substitutions. Additionally, they argue, there should be no limitation upon repeatedly reurging
and reasserting alleged errors committed by the trial court in either state
or federal jurisdictions.
While our great nation is bound together by a Constitution and a
* United States District Judge, Western District of Texas. LL.B., University of
Texas.
1. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293
(1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
2. Most legal historians doubt that there was ever any intention that habeas corpus
writs could be used to obtain relief from unlawful conditions of custody, although the
United States Supreme Court has held that a prisoner may attack the terms of his confinement as well as the fact of the custody itself by habeas corpus; see Johnson v.
Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
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federal judiciary that applies it, the states remain, theoretically at least,
the basic repositories of the police power. The states are, in Mr. Justice
Brandeis' classic phrase, intended to be "the laboratories where social
and economic experiments may be tried without risk to the rest of the
country."'3 Conflicts between the state and federal systems under these
holdings, however, have created notable abrasive areas.

The reason for the friction between the state and federal courts in this
area is apparent when one considers that it is within the power of a
single United States District Judge to grant the writ of habeas corpus in
any state court criminal conviction, regardless of the fairness, care and

conscientiousness with which the state acted in conformity with the then
existing constitutional law.4 Thus, state courts must be ultra clairvoyant

and "correctly anticipate" any change in the federal law.5 This is a
situation which demands forbearance. When forbearance and judicial
restraint are not exercised, the result creates both strain and distortion to
the federal-state relationship, especially where, contrary to the common
law, a person may repeatedly attack the final judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction.'
3. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
4. Palmer v. Comstock, 394 F.2d 395 (9th Cir. 1968).
5. O'Neil v. Nelson, 422 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 402
U.S. 622 (1971).
6. As Mr. Justice Harlan stated in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971):
No one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial system, not society as a whole,
is benefited by a judgment providing a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but
tomorrow and everyday thereafter his continued incarceration shall be subject to
fresh litigation on issues already resolved.
Id. at 691.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1970), a state court determination of the petitioner's
contentions is never res judicata as to a subsequent federal proceeding, unless the United
States Supreme Court denies certiorari on the merits. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 497 (1973). A denial or dismissal of a writ of certiorari without a statement of
reasons is entitled to no weight in considering the merits of a later petition for habeas
corpus. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 489 (1953); Miller v. Carter, 434 F.2d 824, 827
(9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971).
Neither is the denial of habeas relief by another federal court res judicata, Sanders
v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15 (1963), nor is it res judicata even where the claim is
denied by the same court, Hutchinson v. Craven, 415 F.2d 279, 280 (9th Cir. 1969).
Thus, successive applications repeatedly filed on the same grounds may be denied consideration only if the earlier petitions were denied on their merits. Therefore, a decision
on the merits of a factual issue must have been made after an evidentiary hearing, unless it was found that the files and records conclusively resolved any factual issues raised
in a prior application; doubt as to whether the grounds are the same should be resolved
in favor of the petitioner. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16 (1963).
Even if the evidentiary hearing was full and fair, redetermination may not be denied
if the evidence crucial to the adequate consideration of the petition was not developed
in connection with the earlier proceeding for reasons not attributable to the inexcusable
neglect of the petitioner. Smith v. Yeager, 393 U.S. 122, 126 (1968). On the other
hand, the trial court is not required to tolerate needless piecemeal litigation, or entertain
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What I have said with reference to the application of the so-called
"Great Writ" in the habeas corpus cases involving state convictions
applies with equal force to the ever-continuous and endless review of
petition after petition filed by federal prisoners, which are commonly
called "2255 petitions."' 7 However, the abrasive force caused by federal
judges injecting themselves into state court trials and convictions is not
present. This never-ending, never-final source of constant litigation in
the federal courts, involving both state and federal prisoners, has finally
gained the attention of the American Bar Association and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts which are making a concerted
survey, study and recommendation in the interest of eliminating this
vexing and exasperating situation.
BroadeningRemedies
During the past decade, through successive opinions the remedies of
injunction, mandamus and declaratory judgment have been added to the
writ of habeas corpus as an effective means for prisoners to test the daily
restrictions inherent in confinement.8 Of more recent development is a
wave of money damage suits against federal prison authorities for
violation of so-called civil rights. These have been generated by recent
Supreme Court decisions9 together with the already popular federal
damage suits against state authorities under section 1983.10
As previously noted, the prisoner may attack not only the fact of his
custody, but any varied and diverse conditions of that custody itself,
including the prisoner's place of confinement," denial of a right to
collateral proceedings whose only purpose is to vex, harass or delay. Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1, 18 (1963).
An effort should be made by the judge to submit all possible grounds of attack on
the conviction in a comprehensive pretrial order, even though they were not raised in
the petition. This suggestion was made in Sanders. Id. at 18-19.

7. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970), a prisoner may file suit to vacate the sentence
imposed by a federal judge. Such a suit is a civil action.
8. Cates v. Ciccone, 422 F.2d 926 (8th Cir. 1970) (injunction); Sobell v. Attorney
General, 400 F.2d 986 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968)

(declaratory judg-

ment); Walker v. Blackwell, 360 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1966) (mandamus).
9. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Griffin
v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).

The rights of prisoners apparently have now been

elevated beyond those enjoyed by many law-abiding persons in their relations with their
neighbors. It now appears that if the executive branch should fail to provide any of
these so-called rights to the degree of perfection sought by a particular prisoner, it may

be called before a federal court to account for the alleged unlawful action on the pretext of a violation of constitutional law.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970); accord, Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968);
Jones v. Decker, 436 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1970).

11. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (mental hospital for criminally insane).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

3

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 7 [2022], No. 3, Art. 2

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:489

transmit petitions for habeas corpus relief,' 2 and abuse by other inmates

or prison officials.' 3
Jurisdiction of federal prisoner suits against the United States for

14
negligence and mistreatment exists under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
These include medical malpractice, 15 but would not include suits for

claims arising from alleged assault and battery by federal employees or
other intentional torts.'" Of course, this type of action is confronted by

the doctrine of official immunity,' 7 and if the employees were acting
within the course and scope of their employment at the time of the
alleged incident the United States would be substituted as the possibly
liable party.' 8 Further, it is usually held that denial of constitutional

rights under the amendments are not actionable against individuals, but
against the Government "whose conduct they alone limit."' 9
Requirement of Custody

It is specifically required that a prisoner must be in custody at the
time his petition is filed.20 It is now clear that "custody" includes the
prisoner who, though not necessarily in confinement, is on parole or
probation. 2 ' The petitioner is also considered in custody where he has
12. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).

13. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 444 (6th Cir. 1944). In addition to attacking the conditions of custody as well as the fact of the custody itself by habeas petition,
civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) are now alternative remedies and the
petitioner may seek both, perhaps concurrently. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499
n.14 (1973); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971). Damages are not
available in a strictly habeas corpus action.
Habeas petitions concerning the conditions of confinement should be viewed wherever
possible as a civil rights action, so exhaustion of state remedies would not ordinarily
be required. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971). A petition attacking
prison conditions may also be the vehicle for a class action. Williams v. Richardson,
481 F.2d 358, 361 (8th Cir. 1973); Mead v. Parker, 464 F.2d 1108, 1112-13 (9th Cir.
1972).

14. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).

15. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
16. See United States v. Fancea, 332 F.2d 872, 875 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 971 (1965).
17. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569 (1959).
18. Uptagrafft v. United States, 315 F.2d 200, 202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
818 (1963).
19. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946). Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), held that actions alleging violation of fourth amendment
protection against unlawful search and seizure may be brought against federal officials
allegedly responsible. Id. at 397. Under Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538,
547 (1972), however, such a suit must meet the jurisdictional requirements that the
amount in controversy be in excess of $10,000.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (1970).
21. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963); Hahn v. Burke, 430 F.2d 100,
102 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 933 (1971); Benson v. California, 328 F.2d
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been released on bail or his own recognizance." Custody does not
include a non-confinement type sentence where a misdemeanant is

merely fined.28 Similarly, a prisoner receiving a suspended sentence on
unsupervised probation is also presumably not in custody. 4 Thus, the
test of confinement is that the petitioner must have some restriction on
his freedom.28

The confinement requirement presents an interesting problem where
the prisoner has served his sentence. In the ordinary case, habeas corpus
will not lie, the proper remedy being a writ of coram nobis.20 It has been
held, however, that a prisoner is not relegated to coram nobis when he is
released subsequent to his filing a writ of habeas corpus.2 7 Resort to
coram nobis has been made largely unnecessary-by the constantly expanding definition of custody to the point that it is questionable that

custody in any form is necessary for a court to have habeas comus
28

jurisdiction.

EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES

Section 2254 provides that a state prisoner's application shall not be
granted unless he has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of
159, 162 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 951 (1965). In each of these cases,
it was held that the prisoner's release from jail did not render the issue of confinement
moot, thereby making the remedy of habeas corpus unavailable. But release by the
penal institution does render the petition moot if the attack by the prisoner concerns
the conditions of confinement only rather than illegality of detention. Keys v. Dunbar,
405 F.2d 955 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 880 (1969).
22. Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973) (petitioner released on own
recognizance); Burris v. Ryan, 397 F.2d 553, 555 (7th Cir. 1968) (bail).
23. Cohen v. Hongisto, No. 72-274 (9th Cir. Sept. 15, 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
964 (1973).
24. United States ex rel. Dessus v. Pennsylvania, 452 F.2d 557, 560 (3d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 853 (1972); cf. United States ex rel. Nunes v. Nelson, 467 F.2d
1380 (9th Cir. 1972) (parolee, not presently incarcerated or facing parole revocation,
cannot attack conditions of confinement).
25. The Supreme Court has observed:
[Habeas corpus] is not now and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand purpose-the protection of individuals
against erosion of their rights to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty.
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963).
26. United States v. Morgan, 346 -U.S. 502 (1954). The writ of coram nobis was
available at common law to correct factual errors. Id. at 507.
27. Carafas v. La Vallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
Carafas specifically overruled
Parker v. Ellias, 362 U.S. 574 (1960).
28. It had long been the law that unconditional release from state custody made any
pending habeas corpus petition moot since relief from unlawful custody was the sole purpose of the writ. But in Carafas v. La Vallee, 392 U.S. 234, 238 (1968), the Court
held that once the district court has jurisdiction to consider the petition, the subsequent
nnennditional release of the petitioner is of no effect in rendering the case moot.
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the state. 9 When interpreting this provision, some courts have held that
federal consideration of the merits of a petition for habeas corpus must
be deferred until all of the issues raised have been presented in the state
courts.8" In the same month in which the Fifth Circuit so held ia
Madeley v. Kern,"' a different panel of the Fifth Circuit reached an
opposite conclusion in Harris v. Estelle. 2 Apparently, these cases

present a conflict between comity and avoidance of piecemeal litigation
on the one hand, and proper judicial administration and the petitioner's

constitutional rights on the other.
Four months later, another Fifth Circuit panel, citing the Harriscase,
also held that it was proper for a district court to dispose of an
exhausted claim in a federal habeas corpus petition even though it is

joined with other unexhausted claims."3 In at least three other circuits,
the rule is that the district court is required to consider those claims for
which the petitioner has exhausted his remedies even though he has also

raised unexhausted claims. 4 Of course, if the state's highest court has
consistently ruled adversely to the petitioner's contention in a series of
cases involving identical claims, indicating clearly that it would be futile
for the petitioner to attempt to relitigate the issues, then he is not
required to have exhausted his state remedies before raising the issues in

a federal petition. This latter case follows the progeny clearly establish36
ing the doctrine of futility.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970). While this section requires exhaustion of state
remedies, the concept is one of comity only rather than one of jurisdiction. Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 418 (1963). The petitioner is required to exhaust only those state remedies which are still available at the time the petition is filed. Id. at 434-35; accord,
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 516 (1972). But see Lambeti v. Wainwright, 513
F.2d 277, 282 (5th Cir. 1975).
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435 (1963) does not require a petition for certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court to be filed as an element of exhaustion.
The exhaustion doctrine is a judicially crafted instrument which reflects a careful
balance between important interests of federalism and the need to preserve the writ
of habeas corpus as a 'swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint
or confinement.'
Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct., 410 U.S. 484, 490 (1973).
30. See, e.g., Melton v. Patterson, 445 F.2d 410 (10th Cir. 1971); United States ex
rel. Waldron v. Pate, 380 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1054 (1968).
But see Ross v. Craven, 478 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1973).
31. 488 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1974).
32. 487 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1974).
33. Singleton v. Estelle, 492 F.2d 671, 676 (5th Cir. 1974).
34. Tyler v. Swenson, 483 F.2d 611, 614 (8th Cir. 1973); Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316, 1320 (4th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Levy v. McMann, 394
F.2d 402, 404-405 (2d Cir. 1968).
35. Layton v. Carson, 479 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1973).
36. Exhaustion requirements do not apply if there is the "existence of circumstances
rendering [the available state] process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner."
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When a petitioner elects to bypass state remedies, good reason must
exist or the federal court is free to dismiss the petition for lack of

exhaustion. Fay v. Noia37 held that failure to seek a new trial through a
state appellate route was not a deliberate waiver of state remedies, where
the prisoner was faced with the "grisly choice" of a possible death
sentence on remand.8 8 Similarly, it is not a voluntary waiver where the

accused fears offending an all white jury by a challenge to the composition of the panel. 9
Fay v. Noia defines a bypass of state remedies as a procedural default,

deliberately incurred by the prisoner, preventing an orderly adjudication

of federal issues in state courts. 40 The question of this deliberate bypass,

and the reasons for it, must be determined by the federal court in an
evidentiary hearing or by "some other means."'" The Second Circuit has
held that in an evidentiary hearing the burden of showing a deliberate

bypass is on the state;42 therefore, an evidentiary hearing is not necessary where the record in the trial court clearly shows that counsel's
decision to waive a right was deliberate trial strategy.43

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970). Examples include adverse rulings by the highest state
court on the same legal issue, Layton v. Carson, 479 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1973); adverse
decisions on substantially the same contentions against a co-defendant, St. Jules v. Savage, 512 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1975); and inability to obtain consideration of the claim
in courts of the custodial state, see Reed v. Beto, 343 F.2d 723, 725 (5th Cir. 1965),
aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
37. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
38. Id. at 440.
39. Whitus v. Balkcom, 333 F.2d 496, 509 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 931
(1964).
40. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963).
41. Id. at 439.,
42. United States ex rel. Cruz v. La Vallee, 448 F.2d 671, 676 (2d Cir. 1971),cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
43. Nance v. United States, 440 F.2d 617, 619 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
845 (1971). The effect of such a decision as having been made by counsel is not always
a bar to relief, especially when the petitioner did not participate in the decision and exercise a "considered choice." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963). A deliberate decision by counsel which is a matter of trial strategy, however, may bind a non-participating petitioner and foreclose federal relief. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451
(1965). This is true even if made without consulting the petitioner, as was held in
Henry, and may be true even if the petitioner objected. Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d
73, 79 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 964 (1965).
In an analogous situation, recent authority now indicates that a plea of guilty is also
subject to collateral attack by habeas petition even though the prisoner had, in response
to direct questions personally addressed to him by the trial court, acknowledged that his
plea was given voluntarily and that he understood the charges, the consequences of his
plea, and fully admitted his guilt. The contention is that the correct answers were given
under coercion or instructions by his lawyer or others. Fontaine v. United States, 411
U.S. 213, 215 (1973); see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 440 (1963) (guilty plea not a
waiver where "grisly choice" was death sentence). But see Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (guilty plea intelligently made is not invalid merely because it

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

7

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 7 [2022], No. 3, Art. 2

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:489

RULES AND PROCEDURES

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply generally under rule
81(a)(2). Since a petition for habeas corpus is a civil remedy, the
burden of proof is on the petitioner and must be established by a
preponderance of the evidence. 4" Transcripts of the trial proceedings
and the findings of fact in the state court are presumed to be correct
under section 2254(d)45 although a "full and fair" evidentiary hearing
must be granted upon appropriate showing.46
A federal court may rely on the state court's holding only after it
concurs subsequent to an independent review of the state court transcript and the entire record upon which the findings were based. The
state court's findings of fact which may be relied upon by the federal
court are only those made by the trial judge who heard the evidence, not
those of an appellate court.4 If there is a factual dispute, the federal
court must grant an evidentiary hearing if the petitioner alleges that he
did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing.4" The petitioner is not
entitled to a new hearing, however, merely because he can point to
certain errors, irregularities or shortcomings in the state court procedure.49 He must additionally show that if his version of the events is
true, he would be entitled to relief. Thus, a rehearing of historical facts
is not required if it would be a mere exercise in futility. 0
Interpretationof the Petition

In interpreting the habeas corpus petition, certain rules should be
was entered to avoid a possible death sentence); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790,
797 (1970) (intelligent guilty plea not open to attack on ground that lawyer misjudged
admissibility of evidence).
A competently counseled defendant who alleges that he pled guilty because of a prior
coerced confession is not, without more, entitled to a hearing on his petition for habeas
corpus. In such a case, he cannot claim that his bypass of state remedies was not an
intelligent act. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 768-69 (1970).
44. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 457 n.6 (1953).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1970). While the federal courts have power to try the
facts anew and § 2254(d) constitutes a codification of Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293
(1963), as previously observed, the state court's findings made after a fact-finding hearing are presumptively correct. See Johnson v. Copinger, 420 F.2d 395, 398 (4th Cir.
1969).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1970).
47. Hill v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 1346, 1348 (9th Cir. 1972).
48. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 320 (1963).
49. Bishop v. Wainwright, 511 F.2d 664, 666 (5th Cir. 1975).
50. Procunier v. Atchley, 400 U.S. 446, 452 (1971). The federal courts must apply
the correct constitutional standards to the historical facts no matter how fairly, conscientiously and completely the claim has been litigated in the state court, Brown v, Allen,
344 US. 443, 460 (1953).
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kept in mind. The court has the power to deny a petition if it states only
stark conclusions of law with no supporting factual allegations."1 If the
petition is largely conclusionary, but also states a ground which, if
factually established, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the proper
course is to permit the petitioner to proceed in forma pauperis, but to
dismiss the petition with leave to amend the deficiency. 2 If an application to file in forma pauperis is denied, the paper should be retained so
as to be available for appellate review.51
Final Conclusion and Judgment
Inthe event it becomes necessary to grant the writ, the judge should
make it conditional by inserting the following language: "The Writ will
issue unless within sixty days from the date that this order becomes final
the state institutes proceedings to retry the petitioner." Preparatory to
appeal, a motion for rehearing must be filed by the petitioner within 10
days after the entry of the final judgment and notice of appeal must be
filed within 30 days thereafter, unless the period is extended after timely
filing of a motion to extend. 4 These periods are jurisdictional. 5
Appeal

If the district court grants the writ, the state has a statutory right to
appeal to the circuit court of appeals.5 6 The trial court can either deny
or grant the stay of the execution of the judgment pending appeal. If it
grants the stay, the release and/or retrial of the petitioner is delayed
until the appellate court reaches a decision.5 7 In the event the writ is
denied by the trial court, the petitioner may either be detained in
custody pending appellate review, which is the usual case, or bond may
be granted by the judge rendering the decision.5 s Bond is usually
allowed only in exceptional cases.5 9 Should the writ be granted, "the
51. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 19 (1963). Local rules may prescribe the
format and contents for the habeas petition, including the use of an approved form.
Fernandez v. Meier, 432 F.2d 426, 428 (9th Cir. 1970).
52. Pembrook v. Wilson, 370 F.2d 37, 39 (9th Cir. 1966). Ordinarily, the petition
must be verified before a notary public. 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1970).
53. Martin v. United States, 273 F.2d 775, 778 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 853 (1961).
54. Flint v. Howard, 464 F.2d 1084, 1086 (lst Cir. 1972).
55. Id. at 1086.
56. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1970).
57. Id. § 2251.
58. FED. R. App. P. 23(b). Bail may also be allowed by the court of appeals or
the Supreme Court, or any judge or justice thereof.
59. A prisoner should not be released on bail prior to a final determination of the
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prisoner shall be [released] upon his recognizance, with or without
surety, unless the court or justice or judge rendering the decision, or the
court of appeals or the Supreme Court, or a judge or justice of either
court shall order otherwise."0 0
If the petition is dismissed by the trial court as being frivolous and
thereafter a notice of appeal is filed, it necessarily follows that the appeal
itself would be frivolous since the court has found against the petitioner.
In such a case the court is required and should always make exhaustive
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Thereafter, in denying the
motion to appeal in forma pauperis, the court may merely adopt and
incorporate by reference the previous findings in support of its order
denying the petitioner's right to appeal in forma pauperis on the ground
of frivolous appeal.
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR HANDLING

PRISONER PETITIONS

Judge James M. Carter has proposed a worthwhile and useful tool for
processing prisoner petitions. The procedure contemplates that a prisoner, through his court-appointed lawyer, will be required to present and
specify in detail any and all conceivable present or possible future
grounds which might be available to challenge the conviction.6" This is
strictly a lawyer's pretrial proceeding and does not usually involve the
courtroom presence of the prisoner or any character of an evidentiary
hearing whatsoever. It is designed and tends to eliminate repeated
endless future petitions based on new and other additional grounds and
grievances or shades thereof by the same prisoner.
Wingo v. Wedding
While a few of the federal district judges still screen, process and
handle all prisoner grievances personally with the aid of their law clerks
and deputy district clerks, the vast majority, especially multijudge
courts, now rely heavily on their magistrates, frequently with the help of
an "intake" or "writ" clerk. Because of this increased reliance on
petition for habeas corpus unless the circumstances are unusual. Glynn v. Donnelly,
470 F.2d 95, 98 (1st Cir. 1972); Benson v. California, 328 F.2d 159, 162 (9th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 951 (1965). Exceptional circumstances exist when the
conviction is clearly invalid and the sentence would have been served before effective
state review. Boyer v. City of Orlando, 402 F.2d 966, 968 (5th Cir. 1968).
60. FED. R. App. P. 23(c).
61. See Carter, Pre-TrialSuggestions for Section 2255 Cases Under Title 28 United

States Code, 32 F.R.D. 391 (1963). This proposed method was approved in Sanders
v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1963).
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magistrates, the very recent case of Wingo v. Wedding 2 deserves special

treatment. The Court, in holding that it is improper for the trial court to
delegate to the magistrate the responsibility of conducting an evidentiary

hearing in a habeas corpus case, based its decision largely upon the
ground that the Magistrates Act63 expressly provided that the magis-

trate's report and recommendations were to relate to "whether there
should be a hearing." Thus, the decision does not directly decide whether a magistrate may be authorized by statute to conduct such hearings
and make his findings of fact and conclusions of law in prisoner civil
rights cases.64

Because the jurisdiction of the magistrate in section 1983 cases was
not before the Supreme Court in the Wingo case, that decision can be
read as merely dealing with habeas corpus cases. The authority of the
magistrate in section 1983 cases may be clarified by changes in the
Magistrates Act to define his authority or by an amendment to Rule
53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, providing for the
reference of a case to a master. Pending clarification of the magistrate's

authority, it still seems appropriate to utilize the magistrate in conducting evidentiary hearings in section 1983 cases.65 If the authority is
challenged, the matter will, of course, be further clarified in the litigated
case. Assuming that the magistrate can act in this case as a master, there
is doubt as to whether it is necessary for the court to conduct de novo
review of the magistrate's findings or whether the review should be that

applicable to a district court's handling of a recommendation from a
master appointed under present civil rule 53.66
62. 418 U.S. 461 (1974).
63. 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(3) (Supp. 1975).
64. In Campbell v. United States Dist. Ct., 501 F.2d 196, 206-207 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1975), the Ninth Circuit held:
[A] magistrate is authorized to preside at an evidentiary hearing on a motion to
suppress evidence and is authorized to make proposed findings . . . of fact, conclusions of law and a proposed order after a hearing on a motion to suppress ...
[The district court] shall [however] make the final adjudication of the motion to
suppress.
65. The recent case of Cruz v. Hauck, 515 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1975) seems to hold
that a section 1983 civil rights action may be referred to a magistrate for an evidentiary
hearing only by consent of the parties. The case is, however, authority for the proposition that the limitations of the master to hold fact-finding hearings "cannot derive from
constitutional considerations." Id. at 330. This certainly suggests that the Magistrates
Act might be amended to afford these judges the same powers as are enjoyed by masters.
Cruz further holds that the prisoner must object to the referral of the case at the earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise, the failure to timely object will constitute a waiver.
Id. at 331. Also, Cruz holds that "the district court need not consider [complaints from]
those inmates whose confinement is of a very temporary nature or for purposes of transfer to other institutions." Id. at 333.
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2) provides: "In an action to be tried without a jury
the court shall accept the master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous."
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It seems apparent that a duty of total review by the district court is
probably mandatory since it is apparent that the court must make the
ultimate and final decision. Certainly, pending a revision of rule 53 to
enable the appointment of a magistrate pursuant to that rule, it would
seem imperative to grant a de novo review of the magistrate's findings.
This is particularly advisable when the court is faced with the current
problems caused by the shortage of court reporters and the problems
associated with the present practice of tape recording proceedings before
magistrates.
Recommendations of the Aldisert Committee
Increasing prisoner cases led the Federal Judicial Center to appoint a
special committee under the chairmanship of Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert
to study the handling of prisoner cases and to propose improved model
procedures and changes to provide more effective handling and disposition of prisoner petitions.6 7 The committee readily recognized that while
most prisoner petitions are frivolous and should be dismissed without an
evidentiary hearing, some such complaints raise constitutional issues of
great difficulty and importance. It was the expressed aim of the Aldisert
Committee in its temporary report to urge the respective states to assume
increasing responsibility for the protection of the constitutional rights of
its prisoners while at the same time reserving the opportunity to resort to
the federal courts where the state has failed to adequately recognize
these rights by providing trial safeguards.
It also recognizes that there has been a general trend in the direction
of greater state responsibility in the habeas corpus cases which, as
previously noted, are exceedingly disruptive of state-federal relations.
The committee found, however, that this type of development providing
adequate administrative remedies, reviews and appeals has not occurred
in section 1983 prisoner civil rights cases. The committee also
predicted that there is little promise of increased state responsiveness in
these latter cases since, given the present state of the law, the state courts
historically have shown little interest in being involved in prisoner cases
of this type. Furthermore, there is absolutely no present requirement
that the prisoner exhaust his state judicial remedies in section 1983
cases. If in fact he follows state procedures and goes to the state court,
its decision is probably res judicata, thus precluding the opportunity of
his obtaining possible repeated federal review of the decision.
67. The preliminary report of the committee may be found in 64 F.R.D. 312
(1974).
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This committee has also recommended that there be extensive movement towards centralization in multijudge courts, and that any such
courts having a substantial caseload of prisoner complaints should institute a centralized processing method. In these districts, the committee
recommended the appointment of an expert "intake" or "writ" clerk to
initially process these petitions. After this temporary handling, the court
could appoint a law clerk or magistrate to perform the initial screening
of the petition. The suggestion was made that in some large multidistrict courts "all actions commenced by one prisoner should be assigned to the same judge." 8 In this connection, the Aldisert committee
observed that the choice and variation of such procedures can be made
by each court according to its own particular conditions, problems and
needs under its local rules.
To standardize the petitions and thereby expedite their handling, a
suggested complaint form was formulated by the committee. 69 The form
adopted does not contemplate or allow citation of cases and should
include the following: (1) the proper complaint form with instructions
for processing and handling the application; (2) must be verified; and
(3) provide a form for filing under a forma pauperis affidavit. As a
practical proposition, such a standardized form of sworn petition is
absolutely essential to the efficient and expeditious handling and disposition of prisoner cases in any multi-judge court.1 0
In those states where extensive and comprehensive grievance procedures have been adopted-written complaint forms, a review board with
adequate appellate procedures inside the institution, etc.-the number
of prisoner petitions filed has been dramatically curtailed. Furthermore,
the Fifth Circuit has held that a federal prisoner must now exhaust his
administrative remedies and that the district court was authorized to
order the case held in abeyance for at least 60 days until administrative
procedures could be completed through the penitentiary system. 71 In
most of these cases, statistics have established that many of the complaints will be abandoned or resolved administratively within 60 to 120
days; in a great many cases during this period the inmate has been
68. Id.
69. Id. at 316.
70. The requirement of verification has been held to be jurisdictional. Dorsey v.
Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 869 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890 (1945).
71. Rocha v. Beto, 449 F.2d 741, 742 (5th Cir. 1971); see Quick v. Thompkins,
425 F.2d 260, 261 (5th Cir. 1970). But the Fourth Circuit has held that even though
the state had a grievance procedure applicable to state prisoners the petitioner was not
required to exhaust these avenues of relief before filing his complaint in the federal
ermirt. McCrav v. Burrell. 516 F.2d 357, 364 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
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released from custody or transferred to another institution, rendering his
complaint moot.
According to Judge Aldisert's committee, the result of the adoption of
grievance procedures by the respective states has been encouraging. A
significant percentage of the grievances are resolved at the institutional
level and an additional percentage, also significant in number, are
resolved at the administrative appellate level. As previously observed,
some of the cases are abandoned or the prisoner is discharged from
custody or is transferred to another penitentiary.
CONCLUSION

Hopefully, all the work, time and effort of the Aldisert Committee
and many others will resolve or at least alleviate this vexing and
frustrating area of litigation which has so troubled the federal judiciary
and strained relations between the federal and state governments. This is
particularly true since the volume of the grievances is increasing at a
staggering rate. Some federal judges now spend as much as 25 percent
of their time on prisoner cases alone. With the added burdens imposed
on these judges, the bar and the penal system by the new Speedy Trial
Act,72 continued efforts to improve solutions to prisoner complaints
must be vigorously pursued.
72. Pub. L. No. 93-619 (Jan. 3, 1975).
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